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1 Introduction
A key concern in countries contemplating reasonably aggressive carbon pricing—and one
that has become still more prominent since the crisis, as they struggle to restore growth—is
the fear that their competitive position in world markets would be jeopardized by ‘carbon
leakage’ as production shifts elsewhere.1 The likelihood that any mitigation measures will
be strongly asymmetric, at least for coming years, amplifies this concern, which is reflected
in the inclusion in climate change legislation both in the EU2 and in proposals elsewhere
(such as the Waxman-Markey climate and energy bill in the U.S.) of provisions, for ex-
posed emissions-intensive sectors, for various forms of ‘border tax adjustment’ (BTA)3—
meaning the levying of some charge on imports, and remission of charge on exports, to
the extent that carbon prices are higher domestically than elsewhere. Unsurprisingly, the
appropriateness or not of such adjustments has been the focus of heated debate. But
that debate has been largely uninformed by close analysis. Against that background,
the purpose of this paper is to provide a firmer analytical basis for these discussions, in
particular by giving a better sense of whether—or not—some form of BTA might have a
useful role to play in addressing climate challenges.
The theoretical literature has begun to address the linkages between climate (environ-
mental, more generally) and trade policies that are at the heart of this question. Most of
it has focused on non-cooperative policy formation, characterizing nationally trade and
environmental policies and the interplay between them (as in, for instance, Markusen
(1975), Baumol and Oates (1988), Copeland (1996), Panagariya et al. (2004), Copeland
(2011) and Ishikawa and Kiyono (2006)) or desirable directions of reform—whether for
small or large economies—when one or other instrument, environment or trade, is for some
reason constrained away from optimal (as in Copeland (1994), Hoel (1996), Turunen-Red
and Woodland (2004) and Neary (2006)). The key result in this literature, which will be
a useful benchmark below, is that the pursuit of simple national interest requires, when
both instruments can be freely deployed, that the domestic carbon tax be set to reflect
only the national damage from carbon emissions, while tariffs are set with an eye to both
reducing emissions abroad (because that reduces damage at home) and securing standard
terms of trade gains. And there is nothing in this policy that looks like a border tax
adjustment, the presence of any carbon tax abroad then having no direct relevance to
1Instructive discussions of these issues are in Copeland and Taylor (2004) and Sheldon (2006). Levin-
son and Taylor (2008) provide empirical evidence that more stringent environmental regulation reduces
exports.
2Adjustments of this kind, in the context of the EU Emissions Trading System, are provided for in
Directive 2009/29/EC amending Directive 2003/87/EC.
3This has also been advocated by, for instance, Stiglitz (2006).
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policy formation at home.
While this non-cooperative perspective is clearly an important one, an understanding of
the requirements of cooperative policy is also valuable. It would certainly be naive to
imagine that actual climate policies are entirely shaped to the collective good. But nor
are they always easily explained in terms of narrowly defined self-interest. The adoption
of carbon pricing in British Columbia, for instance, and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Ini-
tiative (capping emissions in several U.S. states) do almost nothing for global emissions,
and hence for climate damage, but do impose some local costs. And the EU is under-
taking relatively aggressive mitigation policies even though the costs to its members of
adapting to climate change appear quite low (and for some quite possibly negative).4 The
motives behind these policies are no doubt complex, including perhaps a concern (and
some sense of historic guilt) for the harm that might be suffered elsewhere and a desire
to prod others into action (maybe all overlain with a fear that delaying action to avert
catastrophic effects could be still more costly). But they certainly seem to reflect more
than immediate and narrowly-defined self-interest. Even without delving into motives, in
any event, the implications of cooperative design in relation to climate policies must be a
central benchmark both given the commonplace rhetoric of cooperation in this area—do
policies rationalized from that perspective really make sense?—and perhaps above all for
assessing the appropriateness of whatever policy structures do emerge. One would at least
like to know if policies adopted could be improved in such a way that all countries can
benefit.
This collective perspective has, however, received very little attention in the literature
(the sole exception of which we are aware being the partial equilibrium treatment in Gros
(2009)). The aim in this paper is therefore to explore the interaction between climate and
trade policies in a cooperative setting, with a particular eye to whether or not—and why—
this calls for something recognizable as BTA. It does so by characterizing Pareto-efficient
allocations within a standard general equilibrium model of competitive trade in many
goods, augmented by a climate-like production externality, in which potentially three sets
of policy instruments may be deployed: international lump-sum transfers, carbon pricing,
and tariffs. The first of these are naturally directed to equity concerns, moving the
world around its utility possibly frontier; the second are naturally targeted to controlling
emissions; and the third would have no role if the other two instruments were optimally
deployed. Attention thus focuses on the implications of various constraints on these
instruments for the setting of the others to achieve what we will refer to as constrained
4The results in Obsterghaus and Reif (2010), for example, suggest that the fiscal costs of adaptation
in the EU would be around 16 billion euros per annum (in 2005 prices) by mid-century, though such
figures are subject to considerable uncertainty.
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Pareto-efficient outcomes.
Within this broad class of issues, attention here focusses especially on the question of
whether there are circumstances in which some form of BTA is part of a globally efficient
response to climate change (or to any other environmental problem with broadly the same
border-crossing structure). By ‘border tax adjustment’ we shall mean, in the most general
interpretation, tariff structures that in some direct way reflect differences in national
carbon prices. And of particular interest is the possibility that this adjustment will take
the very simple form commonly envisaged in policy discussions—which is likely the only
one conceivably practicable—of setting a charge on imports equal to some notion of the
carbon charge ‘not paid’ abroad on imports, and remitting tax on exports in similar
fashion.
There are of course many other issues, not addressed here, raised by the possibility of
BTA for carbon prices. These include the questions of whether or not such adjustment is
WTO-consistent (see, for instance, Chapter 5 of OECD (2004), and McLure (2011)),5 very
significant issues of implementability (Moore, 2010); and, not least, the (perhaps limited)
empirical significance of the relative producer price effects of carbon pricing that might
be adjusted for (Houser et al. 2008). Nor does the analysis here consider the potential
merit of BTA as a credible device by which countries implementing carbon pricing can
encourage participation by others.6 Important though these issues are, they are not the
concern here—which is with the pure efficiency case for climate-motivated border tax
adjustment.
To anticipate the results that follow, what emerges, loosely speaking, is that when carbon
taxes and other policies are for some reason constrained in a subset of countries, global
Pareto efficiency requires that other countries not only set their own carbon taxes to
reflect global rather than national damage, but—and more to the point here—that they
set tariffs which embody a form of BTA in the broad sense above. There are here key
differences from the case of nationally-motivated policies. Most straightforwardly, the
unconstrained carbon taxes look to global rather than national harm, and there is of
course no self-interested terms of trade motive. And, at the root of the BTA, the case
for manipulating emissions abroad (now to global rather than national good, of course)
through tariff policy arises from the collective perspective only to the extent that carbon
taxes abroad are constrained at levels different from the collectively efficient level set in
5There are precedents, notably in the U.S Superfund tax and, of particular relevance in the climate
context, for ozone-depleting chemicals.
6Participants themselves presumably gain from the BTAs, and non-participants would then benefit by
imposing a carbon price themselves, at least to the extent that by doing so they would capture revenues
otherwise accruing to others (though terms of trade effects would also play a role).
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the unconstrained country (or countries). The form of the required BTA is generally
complex, but in one special case—inelastic demand and fixed coefficients in emitting and
producing—does indeed reduce to the simple form of practical policy discussions. There is
no collective case for BTA, however, if the constrained countries use cap-and-trade rather
than carbon taxation—because then policy in the unconstrained country cannot affect
emissions there.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 sets out the model, which takes carbon tax-
ation to be the instrument of climate policy, and Section 3 then derives benchmark results
for collectively efficient carbon tax and tariff policies when both these instruments can
be freely set—these results in themselves add little that is not evident from the previous
literature, but provide a reference for the more novel results. These begin in Section 4,
which considers Pareto-efficient policies when carbon taxes and tariffs are constrained in
some countries, establishing that, as just noted, there is then indeed a case for some form
of BTA, both (under weak conditions) in the general sense above and (under strict ones)
in the more precise sense of practical policy discussions. Section 5 then compares these
results with those of Markusen (1975) for non-cooperative policy-making, and considers
their applicability when carbon pricing is by cap-and-trade rather than carbon taxation.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Modeling climate and trade policies
The framework is that of Keen and Wildasin (2004), modified to deal with pollution as a
by-product of production. We consider a perfectly competitive general equilibrium model
of international trade in which there are J countries indexed by the superscript j. In
each country there is a representative consumer and a private sector that produces (only)
N tradeable commodities.7 The N -vector of international commodity prices is denoted
by w.8 (All vectors are column vectors, and a prime indicates transposition). Trade is
subject to trade taxes or subsidies, denoted by the vector τ j in country j; consistent
with most-favored nation rules, each country is assumed to apply the same tariff rates
to all others.9 The commodity price vector in country j is then given by the N -vector
7The inclusion of non-tradeable commodities provides no additional insights. See Vlassis (2013).
8Though world prices are something of a fiction, in the sense that no private agent may trade at them,
they do matter for the revenues that national governments collect.
9As usual, the model is very general in allowing for all types of trade taxes and subsidies. If τ ji > 0
(τ ji < 0) and commodity i is imported by country j, then τ
j
i is an import tariff (import subsidy); if i is
exported by country j then τ ji > 0 (τ
j
i < 0) is an export subsidy (export tax).
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pj = w + τ j.10
The production of each commodity generates some pollutant—we of course have in mind
carbon emissions, though there are many other possible interpretations11—with the N -
vector zj denoting sectoral emissions in country j. Total emissions in country j are thus
given by ι′zj where ι is the N -vector of 1s; and global emissions, on which—as with
the concentration of greenhouse gases in the global atmosphere—damage in each country
depends, are
k =
∑J
l=1
ι′zl . (1)
This damage is assumed to arise (only) directly in consumer welfare, not through pro-
duction possibilities; though perhaps not the most realistic assumption in the climate
context, this helps relate our results to other analyses and results in the literature.12
The representative consumer of country j has preferences represented by the expenditure
function
ej(uj,pj, k) = min
xj
{pj′xj : U j (xj, k) ≥ uj} , (2)
with (derivatives being denoted by subscripts) ejp the vector of compensated demands
and ejk, assumed strictly positive in all countries, being the compensation required for a
marginal increase in global emissions.
Emissions zj are subject to pollution taxes, given by the N -vector sj; these, note, may be
sector-specific.13 Production in country j is competitive and characterized by the revenue
function
rj(pj, sj) = max
yj ,zj
{pj′yj − sj′zj : (yj, zj) ∈ T j} , (3)
where T j is the technology set and yj is the (net) output of tradeable goods (the depen-
dence on underlying endowments being omitted for brevity). The revenue function in (3)
is convex, linearly homogeneous in (pj, sj) and assumed to be twice continuously differ-
entiable; it is further assumed throughout that rjss is non-singular for all p
j, sj.14 (The
10Consumption taxes are excluded from the analysis as they would be irrelevant for countries that are
unconstrained in their use of tariffs and carbon taxes; and would complicate the formalities, with little
additional insight, for those that are constrained.
11And extensions too. The analysis and main results are readily generalized to allow for M -types of
pollutants, and much the same analysis would also apply to pollutants whose emissions do not disperse
uniformly in the atmosphere.
12Kotsogiannis and Woodland (2013) show that allowing for emissions to instead enter production does
not change the essence of the results that follow.
13As in, among others, Copeland (1994), Hoel (1996) and Turunen-Red and Woodland (2004).
14For the properties of the revenue function see Dixit and Normal (1980) and Woodland (1982). See
also Turunen-Red and Woodland (2004).
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fossil fuels from whose use carbon emissions arise are not explicitly identified, though they
can be thought of as being amongst the N commodities, since our interest here is not in
their pricing). Hotelling’s lemma implies that rjp (p
j, sj) = yj is the vector of net supply
functions; it also follows from (3) that rjs (p
j, sj) = −zj: emissions are given by (minus)
the derivative of the revenue function with respect to the sectoral carbon tax rates.
Tax revenues from all sources are assumed to be returned to the domestic consumer as
lump sum. At some points, unrequited commodity transfers between countries will be
allowed; denoting by the αj the N -vector of such transfers received by j, these must
satisfy ∑J
j=1
αj = 0N×1 , (4)
where 0c denotes the c-vector of zeroes. The consumer’s budget constraint in country j
is thus
ej(uj,pj, k) = rj(pj, sj)− sj′rjs
(
pj, sj
)
+ τ j′
(
ejp(u
j,pj, k)− rjp
(
pj, sj
))
+ w′αj . (5)
This simply says that expenditure ej(uj,pj, k) must equal GDP, given by rj(pj, sj), plus
carbon tax revenues (sj′zj), tariff revenue (τ j′
(
ejp(u
j,pj, k)− rjp (pj, sj)
)
; recall that, for
instance, τ ji > 0 means an import tariff if j is imported and a subsidy if it is exported)
and the value at world prices of transfers received by country j (w′αj).
Defining
mj ≡ ejp(uj,pj, k)− rjp
(
pj, sj
)
, (6)
to be the vector of j’s net imports, market clearing requires that∑J
j=1
mj = 0(N−1)×1 , (7)
where, by Walras’ Law, the market-clearing equation for the first commodity is dropped.
The same commodity is taken as numeraire, and, without loss of generality, to be untaxed
in all countries: so τ j1 = 0 and p
j
1 = 1 = w1, for j = 1, . . . , J ; it is also assumed throughout
that, for all j, mjp is non-singular.
Given tariffs τ j and carbon taxes sj, for j = 1, . . . , J , a vector of international transfers αj
satisfying (4), the market equilibrium conditions (7), and the national budget constraints
(5), the system may be solved for the equilibrium world price vector w and the vector of
national utilities u = (u1, . . . , uJ)′.15
15Differentiability of all functions at the initial equilibrium is assumed. Standard assumptions hold, so
an equilibrium exists (Woodland (1982)).
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The analysis that follows proceeds by characterizing the set of Pareto-efficient allocations
under a range of assumptions on the instruments available. In general there are of course
an infinite number of such allocations. While it would be possible to focus on just one
by appealing to some specific social welfare function—and as will be seen the results
can indeed be so interpreted—or bargaining solution, the approach here has the merit of
identifying features (including the potential use of BTAs) that are generic to any process
that leads to a Pareto-efficient outcome.
Formally, we proceed by using Motzkin’s Theorem of the Alternative to characterize
Pareto-efficient carbon tax and tariff structures. The necessary conditions for this are
derived in Appendix A. These involve J country-specific variables σj that pick out the
particular point on the utility possibility frontier being characterized. In effect, σj can—
but need not—be thought of as the implicit social marginal value, evaluated at the Pareto-
efficient allocation being characterized, of the utility of country j:16 if, for instance,
σi > σj then country i is in this sense implicitly more ‘income-needy’ at the allocation
being described than country j. While the formal role of the σj is thus no more than
mechanical, the discussion and intuition can then proceed as if the problem were one
of simply maximizing some social welfare function, having marginal welfare weights σj,
with the assurance that, behind the scenes, whatever instruments are available can be
used to translate what is then expressed as an increase in social welfare into a Pareto
improvement.
3 The benchmark: Unconstrained carbon tax and
tariff policies
To fix ideas, this section considers briefly the relatively straightforward case in which
there are no constraints on the carbon taxes and tariffs that can be set in any country. In
doing so it combines the results of Chichilnisky and Heal (1984) and Sandmo (2005, 2006),
on optimal environmental taxation in the absence of tariffs and international transfers,
with those of Keen and Wildasin (2004), on efficient tariff structures in the absence of
environmental concerns. While the results in this section are thus as previous work would
lead one to expect, they provide a useful reference point for later and more interesting
16This interpretation follows from the formalities in the Appendix A on noting that the conditions in
(A.15)-(A.16) are equivalent to those of maximizing a social welfare function Ω(u) with marginal welfare
weights Ω′u = y
′Λu, the typical element of which is σj(eju−τ j′ejpu)+v′ejpu, where v is a vector of shadow
values that emerges in the application of Motzkin’s theorem in Appendix A. When tariffs and carbon
taxes are unconstrained, (B.4) then implies that σj = Ωuj/e
j
u, so that the σ
j is the social marginal utility
of income of country j; more precisely, σi/σj is the social marginal value of income in country i relative
to that in country j.
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cases.
Starting with the case in which carbon taxes and tariffs can be freely deployed in all
countries:
Proposition 1 At any Pareto-efficient allocation, constrained only by an inability to
make explicit international lump sum transfers, there exists a vector17 σ  0J such that:
(a) The vector of carbon taxes in country j is given by
σjsj =
(∑J
i=1
σieik
)
ι 0N×1 , (8)
so that for all j, sj =
(∑J
i=1 θ
ijeik
)
ι, where θij = σi/σj, j = 1, . . . J.
(b) The tariff vectors of any pair of countries j and i are collinear:
τ j = θijτ i, j, i = 1, . . . , J . (9)
Proof : See Appendix B. 
Part (a) is straightforward: Pareto efficiency requires that each country sets its carbon tax
in each sector n to equate the implicit social value of the revenue it would lose from a small
cut in its own emissions, σjsjn, to the sum of the marginal environmental benefits conveyed
to all countries,
∑J
i=1 σ
ieik. An immediate implication, since the marginal damage from
emissions is the same whichever sector they originate in, is that each country should apply
the same carbon tax to all activities: within each country, carbon taxes are optimally
uniform across sectors. But while each country sets a single carbon tax rate, part (a) also
shows that the level of that tax generally differs across countries. Recalling the informal
interpretation of σj above, Pareto efficiency requires that more ‘income-needy’ countries
impose lower carbon taxes. This is intuitively natural, and to the same effect as the results
of Chichilnisky and Heal (1994) and Sandmo (2005, 2006)—and consistent too with much
of the policy debate, which has emphasized the lesser ability of lower income countries to
cope with aggressive carbon pricing.
Part (b), requiring collinear tariff vectors, is as in Keen and Wildasin (2004). The impli-
cation is that production efficiency—in the narrow sense of it being impossible to increase
global output of any good without reducing the global output of some other—is gener-
ally not part of the solution. And there is generally production inefficiency in a broader
sense too, when account is also taken of environmental concerns. Maximizing the net
output of some good without either reducing the net output of another or increasing
17The notation q 0 means that all elements of the vector q are strictly positive.
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global emissions requires that both producer prices p and carbon taxes s be equalized
across countries. Proposition 1 points to violations on both of these margins (or nei-
ther): in each case, relative (implicit) ‘welfare weights’ shape the proportionality factor
between the (sectorally uniform) carbon taxes and tariffs applied by each country. Keen
and Wildasin (2004) discuss the potential rationale for production inefficiency at some
length.18 Broadly, production inefficiency may be called for when distributional concerns
across countries cannot be pursued by direct transfers between them. Tariff policy can
be used to similar end: combining an export subsidy in a less income-needy country A,
for instance, with an import tariff in a more income-needy country B serves to transfer
revenue from the former to the latter. Ensuring that such implicit transfers are well-
targeted, however, may require differentiating those tariffs across countries (with perhaps
an even larger import tariff in some even more income-needy country C—which implies
production inefficiency.
Proposition 1 applies whether or not international transfers between countries can be
deployed. If they can be then, of course, Pareto-efficiency requires equalizing the σj
across all countries. The same may be true, however, even without international transfers:
if there are more goods on which the tariff rates may be varied than there are countries
(and sufficient rank in the corresponding matrix of net exports), then—as just described—
offsetting tariffs can be designed so as to achieve any desired reallocation of tariff revenue
between countries, with no need to distort production decisions (Keen and Wildasin (2004)
and Turunen-Red and Woodland (2004)). These circumstances give the familiar textbook
results: carbon taxes are then set at first best Pigovian levels, tariff policy has no role,
and there is full production efficiency:
Proposition 2 If there are no constraints on lump transfers between countries, or there
are at least as many goods as countries (and an appropriate rank condition on the matrix
of net exports is satisfied), then, at any Pareto-efficient allocation:
(a) The vector of carbon taxes in every country j is given by
sj = s =
(∑J
i=1
eik
)
ι 0N×1, j = 1, . . . , J , (10)
and
(b) tariffs are zero in every country
τ j = 0(N−1)×1, j = 1, . . . , J . (11)
Proof : See Appendix C. 
18While there are no environmental issues in their setting, the same general intuition applies here.
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In the relatively unconstrained world of Propositions 1 and 2, there is thus an alignment
of instruments with objectives that is straightforward and as expected: with international
transfers dealing with distributional concerns, carbon taxes are addressed to the climate
externality and are optimally uniform across both sectors and countries,19 while tariffs—
except in so far as they may be needed to substitute for explicit transfers—are redundant.
Importantly for present purposes, there is nothing in Propositions 1 and 2 that is in the
nature of a border tax adjustment: no sign, that is, of the efficient tariff in any country
reflecting the difference between its own carbon tax and those of the other countries.20
A case for BTA can thus arise only in more constrained circumstances. It is to this
possibility that we now turn.
4 Pareto efficiency and the role of border tax adjust-
ments
Suppose now—going to something of the opposite extreme to the circumstances of the
previous section—that carbon taxes and tariffs can be freely set in some country h (= 1,
in the two country case, referred to as ‘unconstrained’, and sometimes as ‘home’), but ev-
erywhere else (in ‘constrained’ countries, abroad) are fixed at arbitrary levels. Specifically,
we will have in mind in the informal discussion that carbon taxes in the latter—which
may be sector-specific—are ‘too low’ (relative to the first-best Pigovian carbon-tax).
This is of course in itself an arbitrary restriction on the set of available instruments. But
it is not without some resonance of the current climate debate. In particular, the accepted
UNFCCC principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibility’,21 has largely manifested
itself in the view that advanced economies are to undertake much more significant mitiga-
tion measures than are emerging and developing countries. And the EU, for instance, has
committed to undertake significant mitigation measures irrespective of action elsewhere.
With the wider good at least cited as a rationale for such unilateral action, it is useful to
know what such a policy might look like—and whether it would include a role for BTAs.
For clarity, it is useful to approach this question in two steps. Subsection 4.1 deals first
with the case in which distributional issues can be dealt with by international lump-sum
19The same outcome would of course be achieved under a global cap-and-trade scheme, establishing a
single global carbon price.
20In the latter case, of course, there is simply no difference in carbon taxes.
21United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change; the reference is to Principle 1 of Article
3.
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transfers. This, together with further standard simplifying assumptions, gives rise to some
sharp results. Subsection 4.2 then turns to the more general and complex case.
4.1 Border tax adjustments in the absence of distributional con-
cerns
It is useful to start with the relatively simple case, which gives a crisp result upon which
some intuition can be built.
Proposition 3 Suppose there are only two countries, 1 and 2, with carbon taxes and
tariffs fixed at arbitrary levels in country 2 but unconstrained in country 1, that lump
sum transfers between the two countries are unconstrained and that compensated demands
for the non-numeraire commodities n = 2, ..., N are independent of emissions (so that
ejpk = 0(N−1)×1). Then constrained Pareto efficiency requires that:
(a) Carbon taxes in the unconstrained country 1 satisfy
s1′ =
(∑2
j=1
ejk
)
ι′ , (12)
and
(b) tariffs in country 1 satisfy
τ 1′ = τ 2′ +
(
s1 − s2)′ r2sp (e2pp − r2pp)−1 . (13)
The proof of this will be seen to emerge as a special case of Proposition 5 below.
Now, and in the absence of emission effects through compensated demands (something
we return to shortly below), the unconstrained carbon tax is set at its first-best Pigovian
level. The unconstrained tariff τ 1 in (13), meanwhile, is doing two things. First, it is
neutralizing the potential production inefficiency induced by the constrained tariff abroad:
setting τ 1 = τ 2 would ensure that producer prices in the two countries coincide. Second—
and of most interest here—it is reflecting the difference in carbon taxes between the two
countries, differing from zero only to the extent that the carbon tax abroad is not set at
its first best level. This latter element of the Pareto efficient tariff is thus a form of border
tax adjustment.
The nature of the BTA called for in Proposition 3 is though somewhat complex, reflecting
the structure of the matrix22 r2sp and the price elasticity of net imports in the constrained
22This is Copeland’s (1994) indicator of sectoral pollution intensity. The point here is also closely
related to the observation of Lockwood and Whalley (2010) that a case for BTA can arise only when
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country. The critical role played by r2sp indicates that the essential rationale for the BTA
is to manipulate producer prices p2 in the constrained country so as to affect emissions
−r2s there: if r2sp = 0N×(N−1), there is no possibility of doing so, and there is simply no
collective case for a purposive tariff policy. This result, incidentally, provides an answer
to one question that has lingered in the literature: whether the border tax adjustment
should reflect technology in the adjusting country, abroad, or some mixture of the two:
Proposition 3 shows that constrained Pareto efficiency requires that adjustment (both
the tariff on imports and the refund on exports) be made by reference to the technology
abroad (in the constrained country). The reason is straightforward: since it is inefficiency
in emissions abroad that policy is intended to address, it is technology there which should
shape that policy.
This enables the intuition underlying Proposition 3 to be developed more precisely in two
ways, reflecting the dual interpretation of r2sp: as r
2
sp = −z2p, the interpretation just used,
reflecting the impact of producer prices on emissions; and as r2sp = y
2
s , the impact of
carbon prices on production.
For an interpretation along the first of these lines, suppose, for simplicity, that (in ad-
dition to the assumptions of the proposition) all carbon taxes and tariffs are zero in the
constrained country, 2. Recalling that optimality requires that any conceivable marginal
changes in policy have zero impact (given the availability of international transfers) on
the sum of utilities, consider the particular policy of combining a change in world prices,
and hence of producer prices in the constrained country, of dw = dp2, with an offsetting
change in the unconstrained tariff, dτ 1 = −dw. It can then be shown23 (assuming for
simplicity that e2pu = e
2
pk = 0(N−1)×1) that the consequent change in global welfare is
e1udu
1 + e2udu
2 = −(e1k + e2k)dk − τ 1′
(
e2pp − r2pp
)
dp2 . (14)
The first effect in (14) is simply the global social benefit of any reduction in coun-
try 2’s emissions induced by the change in producer prices there. The second term is
−τ 1′ (e2pp − r2pp) = −τ 1′dm2, which in turn is equal, in equilibrium, to τ 1′dm1; this
effect, reflecting the impact of the reform on the distortion of trade implied by the initial
tariff structure, is thus harmful to the extent that it decreases 1’s imports of goods that
are subject to a positive tariff. Optimal policy implies balancing these two effects; which,
differential carbon taxes affect relative producer prices: otherwise the exchange rate (or domestic price
level) will accommodate such differences automatically.
23By summing the two equations in (5), perturbing the result using (7) and holding both τ 2 and s2
constant at zero.
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since dk = ι′z2pdp
2 = −ι′r2spdp2, requires
τ 1′ =
(
e1k + e
2
k
)
ι′r2sp
(
e2pp − r2pp
)−1
. (15)
And this, recalling part (a) of Proposition 3, is precisely as part (b) implies in this case.
The kind of policy thus called for is a reduction in the producer price of ‘dirty’ goods in
the constrained country, to discourage their production there, combined with a tariff that
offsets the tendency for the unconstrained country to consequently import more of those
dirty goods.
For the second interpretation, continue with the assumptions of the previous paragraph
but suppose that country 2 now raises its carbon tax from zero to the Pigovian level,
e1k + e
2
k, while holding its tariff unchanged at zero. If, in response, tariffs in country 1
are eliminated—as part (b) of Proposition 3 requires—and world prices adjusted to leave
prices p1 unchanged, then the change in country 2’s exports (to a linear approximation)
is24
dm2′ = τ 1′
(
e2pp − r2pp
)− (e1k + e2k) ι′r2sp . (16)
But then (15) implies that dm2 = 0(N−1)×1. That is, a collective policy response consistent
with Proposition 3 leaves country 2’s exports (roughly) unaffected. Turning the point the
other way: the collectively efficient tariff policy undoes (to a first approximation) the
trade impact of any country setting its carbon taxes away from the Pigovian level.
While Proposition 3 calls for what is recognizably a form of BTA—conditioning the uncon-
strained tariff directly on the difference in carbon tax rates between the two countries—it
is substantially more complex than the type of BTA envisaged in practical discussions.
As noted above, in principle it is necessary to adjust the difference in carbon taxes to
reflect the elasticities of output with respect to carbon taxes abroad and the price elastic-
ities of foreign net imports. In practice, what is commonly in mind is a more mechanical
calculation (perhaps the only type with any hope of verifiability) of charging imports
(and refunding on exports) an amount equal to the shortfall of the carbon tax actually
paid abroad, directly and indirectly, relative to that which would have been paid had the
home country carbon tax been applied. To express this in the present notation, denote
by B2 (p2, s2) the N × (N − 1) matrix whose typical element bnl denotes the production
of good n required, in country 2, per unit of output of non-numeraire good l, and by Φ2
the N × N diagonal matrix whose element φn gives carbon emissions per unit of gross
output (assumed constant). Then the mechanical BTA just described corresponds to the
24This follows from dp1 = dw = − dτ 1 = τ 1, and ds2 = (e1k + e2k) ι (as well as the temporary
assumption that e2pu = e
2
pk = 0(N−1)×1).
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vector
γ ′ =
(
s1 − s2)′Φ2B2 (p2, s2) , (17)
whose elements give the amount by which the carbon tax paid per unit of output in
country 2 falls short of that which would have been paid, given the production techniques
used in country 2, had the carbon tax rates of country 1 been applied.
To relate this to the more complex form of BTA called for by Proposition 3, write emissions
in country 2 as
z2 = −r2s
(
p2, s2
)
= Φ2B2
(
p2, s2
)
r2p
(
p2, s2
)
. (18)
Assuming emissions per unit of output to be constant, differentiating (18), using Propo-
sition 93 of Dhyrmes (1978), gives
−r2sp = Φ2
[
B2 r2pp+∆
2 B2p
]
, (19)
where ∆2 ≡ r2′p ⊗ IN and B2p = ∂vec(B2) /∂p2. Substituting (19) into (13) and recalling
(17), the BTA of Proposition 3 can then also be written as25
τ 1′ = τ 2′ + γ ′ − (s1 − s2)′Φ2 [B2e2pp + ∆2B2p] (e2pp − r2pp)−1 . (20)
The constrained Pareto-efficient BTA thus requires two adjustments to the mechanical
form of BTA in (17) based on technology abroad, to allow for the impact on emissions
that a change in prices abroad may have through changes in both patterns of input use
(through B2p) and/or demand (through e
2
pp).
It follows immediately from (20) that:
Proposition 4 In the circumstances of Proposition 3, if emissions per unit of output are
constant, there are no substitution effects in demand between non-numeraire commodities
(e2pp = 0(N−1)×(N−1)), and required inputs of goods per unit of output are fixed (B
2
p =
0N(N−1)×(N−1)) then constrained Pareto efficiency requires that:
τ 1 = τ 2 + γ . (21)
Here then is a case in which collectively efficient policy has a remarkably simple form.
The unconstrained carbon tax should be set at the first-best Pigovian level and the border
tax adjustment should take the form of a countervailing charge on imports (and refund
on exports) corresponding mechanically to the tax ‘under-paid’ in the foreign country.
25Making also use of the fact that
(
e2pp − r2pp
) (
e2pp − r2pp
)−1
= I
N−1 implies −r2pp
(
e2pp − r2pp
)−1
=
I
N−1 − e2pp
(
e2pp − r2pp
)
.
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One important difference from common proposals, however, is that, to the extent that
technologies differ between the two countries, the rebate on exports will generally not
equal the carbon tax paid at home.
Proposition 4 rests on simplifying assumptions. It does suggest, nevertheless, that—
conceptually at least—proposals for border adjusting carbon taxes commonly encountered
in policy discussion are not wholly misplaced, from the perspective of global efficiency at
least. While that broad truth remains, its precise form becomes much more complicated
under more general conditions, as is taken up next.
4.2 Border tax adjustments in the general case
Reverting to the general case in which explicit international transfers cannot be deployed,
there are many countries and pollution may affect commodity demands, efficient carbon
tax and tariff structures are substantially more complex:
Proposition 5 Suppose that carbon taxes and tariffs are freely variable in country h but
are taken as fixed elsewhere. Then at any constrained Pareto efficient allocation there
exists a vector σ  0J such that:
(a) Carbon taxes in h are given by
σhsh′ =
{∑J
j=1
σjejk +
∑J
j 6=h
(
σhτ h − σjτ j)′ ejpk} ι′, (22)
and
(b) tariffs in h are such that
σhτ h′ = −
∑J
j=1
σjmj′
(
Qh
)−1
+
∑J
j 6=h
σjτ j′mjp
(
Qh
)−1
(23)
+
∑J
j 6=h
(
σhsh − σjsj)′ rjsp (Qh)−1 ,
where Qh ≡∑Jj 6=h mjp .
Proof : See Appendix D. 
As anticipated earlier, the simpler Proposition 3 above emerges as a special case of this
on setting σj = σ, ejpk = 0(N−1)×1 for all j, and, recalling (7), noting that with only two
countries the first two terms on the right of (23) reduce to τ j.
For the interpretation of Proposition 5 itself, consider first part (a). As one might expect
(and in line with Proposition 1), with distributional concerns again present the carbon
tax to be set in any unconstrained country reflects the welfare-weighted rather than the
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simple sum of the marginal climate damages suffered by others. But a new consideration
also now arises (the last term in (22)), with efficiency requiring a recognition the carbon
tax set in h, by affecting emissions and hence demand structures in the constrained
countries, impacts distortions associated with the tariffs set there. To the extent, for
instance, that the fall in emissions implied by increasing the carbon tax in h increases
demand in some constrained country j for goods that tariff distortions imply are under-
imported there (the tariff imposed by country j being lower than any export subsidy
imposed by country h—both adjusted by the corresponding implicit welfare weights), so
that
(
σhτ h − σjτ j)′ ejpkι′ > 0′1×N , this calls for sh to be set higher than would otherwise
be the case. In this way, the unconstrained carbon tax is used to reduce the distortions
associated with imperfections of collective tariff policies. If, for example, a warming in
climate leads in country j to increase demand for heating equipment that is subject to a
large import tariff, this becomes an argument for a lower carbon tax in country h.
One other aspect of part (a) bears emphasis: since it implies that sh is collinear with ι,
the carbon tax in the unconstrained country h should be uniform across sectors, whether
or not it is uniform in the constrained countries. The best way to respond, if need be,
to sectoral differentiation abroad, is through the tariff structure. The proper task of the
carbon tax is to address inefficiencies in the aggregate level of emissions.
For the characterization of efficient tariff policies in part (b), the novelties relative to
Proposition 3 all come from the presence of distributional concerns. The first term on the
right of (23) relates to the distributional impact of terms of trade effects associated with
varying tariffs in country h (vanishing if international lump sum transfers can be deployed)
and the second to the interaction with tariff distortions abroad. Of most interest here is the
final term,
∑J
j 6=h
(
σhsh − σjsj)′ rjsp (Qh)−1. This is a BTA in the broad sense defined in
the introduction and discussed after Proposition 3, but now with carbon taxes weighted by
implicit income neediness, σj. Loosely speaking, in the absence of international transfers,
more weight is attached to the real income loss that carbon taxation causes in more
income-needy countries, so that constrained Pareto efficiency requires border tax adjusting
in a way which pretends that poorer countries have higher carbon taxes than is actually
the case.
There is no entirely sharp targeting of instruments to objectives in Proposition 5: when
international transfers cannot be made, tariff and carbon tax policies become closely
intertwined. There are, nevertheless fairly clearly-defined rules for the two. Carbon taxes
are addressed to global climate change and an interaction, through demand effects, with
tariff distortions; and tariffs are set with an eye partly to BTA, along the lines discussed
above, and partly to engineering distributionally-judicious movements in terms of trade.
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5 Further discussion
This section compares the results above to those of Markusen (1975) for the non-cooperative
case and asks how the case for BTA is affected when countries use not carbon taxes but
cap-and-trade systems.
5.1 Comparison with non-cooperative policies
While the focus of this paper is on cooperative policy-making, the framework is sufficiently
general to encompass the (much more studied) case in which the choice of carbon tax and
tariff policies of country h are motivated by national interest (as in, for example, Markusen
(1975) and Panagariya et al. (2004)). This can be done—taking again country h to be
the unconstrained country—simply by setting σj = 0 for all j 6= h in Proposition 5 (as a
simple device for attaching no weight to welfare in countries other than h). Proceeding
in this way, Proposition 5 implies that carbon taxes satisfy
sh′ = ehkι
′ + τ h′
∑J
l 6=h
elpkι
′, (24)
and tariff policies are set such that
τ h′ =
[
−mh′ + ehk
∑J
l 6=h
(
ι′rlsp
)] (
Qh
)−1
. (25)
Equations (24) and (25) are the many-country counterparts of Markusen (1975)—see, in
particular, his equation (15). The unilateral response of country h (to carbon pricing and
tariff policies in other countries) in other countries thus has some common features with
the cooperative one in Proposition 5. In each case, the carbon tax is set with a view to
the impact of the induced change in global emissions on demand patterns abroad, and
hence on domestic trade distortions, and in each case tariff policy reflects terms of trade
impacts. The two main differences are as one would expect: in the cooperative case, the
carbon tax reflects global damage from emissions, not simply national; and terms of trade
impacts, along with interactions with existing tariff structures, are assessed not by the
interests of the national economy alone but by the implicit welfare weights of all countries.
5.2 Border tax adjustment and cap-and-trade
It has been assumed so far that the climate instruments deployed, if any, are carbon taxes.
An alternative, however, is cap-and-trade: not levying a charge directly on emissions,
but instead issuing a fixed number of tradable emission rights. This alternative is of
considerable practical importance, perhaps even more so than carbon taxation: it is
schemes of this kind that have been adopted by the EU and which have made most
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headway in the U.S. The question is whether the conclusions above continue to apply
when the instrument of climate policy is not a carbon tax, but national-level cap-and-
trade.26
The essence of the results in Section 3—when instrument choice is unconstrained—clearly
apply essentially unchanged. This is a simple consequence of the familiar equivalence, un-
der perfect certainty27 (as assumed here) of carbon taxation and cap-and-trade,28 and of
the result above that sectoral differentiation of carbon taxation (which could not be repli-
cated by permits tradable between sectors) cannot be part of a Pareto-efficient allocation:
analogues of Propositions 1 and 2 thus hold with the characterizations of carbon taxes
reinterpreted as characterizing emissions caps in terms of the associated shadow value
of emissions. (Whether the pollution permits are auctioned or allocated free of charge,
critical in practice, is immaterial here, given the lump sum return of any revenues raised).
What though if, as in the earlier discussion, the instrument choice is constrained in some
country? For brevity, again assume, as in Subsection 4.1, just two countries, with lump-
sum transfers between them available.29
If the constrained country uses carbon taxation, Propositions 3-5 continue to apply even
if the unconstrained uses cap-and-trade, since any allocation that can be achieved when
it uses carbon taxation—as above—can be replicated by instead fixing the corresponding
level of domestic emissions as the cap in a trading scheme.
Matters are very different, however, if the constrained country uses cap-and-trade. For
then policies adopted in the unconstrained country can have no impact on emissions in
the constrained country.30 Since the sole rationale of BTA in the cooperative case is to
26A global cap-and-trade scheme would of course imply a globally uniform emissions price, obviating
any question of border tax adjustment.
27There is large literature on the choice between taxation and cap-and-trade under uncertainty: see,
for instance, Pizer (2002) and Aldy et al. (2010).
28More precisely, the important point for present purposes is that any allocation which can be supported
with a uniform carbon tax in some country can also be supported as an equilibrium in which that country
adopts a cap-and-trade scheme. To see this, note that a uniform carbon tax at rate sh in country
h generates total emissions there of zh = −ι′rhs
(
ph, sh
)
. Reinterpreting this as the market-clearing
condition for the trading of emission rights in a cap-and-trade scheme, the assumed non-singularity of rhss
implies that setting any level of emissions generated by a uniform carbon tax as the cap in an emissions
trading scheme (and maintaining all tariffs and carbon prices elsewhere unchanged) will generate an
equilibrium carbon price exactly equal to that carbon tax; and it is clear that the equilibrium condition
(5) and (7) will also be satisfied at unchanged tariffs.
29We omit proofs of the claims that follow: these are straightforward once the structure of Section 2 is
reformulated in terms of emission levels rather than carbon taxes.
30So long, that is, as the emission cap there is binding. It could in principle be that in some efficient
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manipulate emissions in the constrained country, it can in this case serve no purpose. The
point that quantity restrictions in one country powerfully affect the implications of trade
reform in others is a familiar one: see for instance Copeland and Taylor (2005, pp. 123),
Falvey (1988) and, closest to the present context, Copeland (1994). The implications do
not seem to have been recognized, however, in the context of BTAs: the collective case
for such adjustment depends not only on the level of carbon prices abroad but also on
the way in which any carbon pricing there is implemented.
6 Concluding remarks
This paper has explored the interplay between climate- and trade-related instruments
in forming globally efficient responses to climate change. An inability to make lump
sum transfers, as Sandmo (2004, 2005) has shown, generally makes non-uniform (across
countries) carbon pricing Pareto efficient. One role that then emerges for tariff policies is
in easing these constraints by serving as a surrogate transfer device. A second potential
role, much closer to the terms of the current policy debate, and on which most of the
analysis has focused, is in mitigating the distortions that arise from these cross-country
differences in carbon prices. The results here have identified circumstances in which
global efficiency does indeed require some form of BTA—as well as others in which it does
not—and has characterized the form of adjustment needed.
The first role emerges most clearly when there are no constraints on the rates at which
carbon taxes (or emission levels under cap-and-trade schemes) and tariffs can be set,
but international transfers are ruled out. The implications of Pareto-efficiency are then
straightforward: carbon prices should be uniform across sectors within countries (or per-
mits tradable across them), but constrained Pareto efficiency generally requires that they
differ across countries: broadly speaking, they are lower in countries for which the implicit
equity welfare weights associated with the allocation being described are higher. This is
a quite different role from that of responding to distortions arising from the differences in
carbon prices.
The second purposive role for tariff policy, including an element of BTA, emerges when
climate policies are constrained in some countries that undertake their mitigation through
carbon taxes (perhaps of zero). It then remains optimal to set those carbon prices that
can be deployed freely—whether explicitly by taxation or implicitly by cap-and-trade—in
line with (a simple modification of) the Pigou rule. Tariffs in such countries should now
allocations the unconstrained country sets its tariffs so as to drive emissions abroad below the cap. In
that case, the situation in the constrained country is the same, at the margin, as if it set a carbon tax of
zero; and so the earlier results for that case apply.
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reflect the cross-country differences in carbon prices this implies, the purpose being to
induce changes in the producer prices faced by firms abroad that go some way towards
offsetting the impact of inadequacies (from the collective perspective) of carbon pricing
there; or, equivalently, to undo the impact of those inadequacies on trade flows. The
results here fully characterize the BTA required. This, in general, requires weighting the
shortfall in carbon taxes in the constrained country (relative to the modified-Pigovian
price charged in the unconstrained) by the carbon-price responsiveness of outputs and
the price elasticity of exports in the former and, when international transfers cannot be
deployed, treating poorer—more exactly, those with a high implicit welfare weight at
the particular constrained Pareto efficient allocation being characterized—as if they had
higher carbon taxes than is in fact the case. The analysis has also identified, however, one
special but instructive case in which the required BTA takes precisely the simple form—as
envisaged in practical policy debate and proposals—of a charge on imports (and rebate
on exports) equal to the carbon tax ‘not paid’ abroad.
A case for BTA thus emerges only in terms of cooperative policy making—as previous
results have shown, and as noted above, there being no such case when climate and tariff
policies are set in terms of national self-interest—and, even then, only given restrictions
on the ability to freely deploy climate and trade policies in some countries. Views may
differ on the importance of such circumstances, though they do to some degree echo the
realities that UNFCCC principles mean that strong mitigation actions are most expected
of advanced countries, and that many countries invoke the rhetoric of the collective good
in rationalizing their actions and proposals.
It has also been seen, however, that collective efficiency does not call for any form of
BTA if it is (binding) cap-and-trade policies, not carbon taxation, that is the constrained
instrument—a point of some importance as cap-and-trade seems, increasingly, to be the
preferred instrument in practice. The reason is straightforward: emissions in countries
using such schemes cannot be affected by policies elsewhere. While there has been some
discussion of the practical differences between implementing BTAs under carbon taxes
and cap-and-trade, the wider point that the underlying economic case for adjustment is
entirely different in the two cases—and, in terms of collective efficiency, much weaker
under cap-and-trade—seems not to have been recognized.
The analysis here is of course severely limited in several respects. Factors have been
assumed immobile, for example, precluding the possibility of carbon leakage through
location choices that is a major concern in policy debates. And assessing the quantitative
significance of the results above—the likely magnitude (and distribution) of the welfare
gains from the constrained efficient BTA of Proposition 4, for instance, and the extent to
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which they can be realized by the simpler form of BTA found in practical proposals—is
left to future work. What the analysis here does establish, however, is that while practical
proposals are no doubt ultimately driven primarily by some notion of national (or sectoral)
self-interest, an inability to deploy a full set of instruments in all countries can create a
conceptual case for the use of BTAs along broadly the lines often proposed—in relation
to carbon taxes, but not cap-and-trade—in the more appealing terms of global efficiency.
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Appendices
Appendix A: Necessary conditions for Pareto efficiency
Perturbing (5), using (1), pj = w + τ j and recalling that rjs = −zj, gives
λjudu
j−λj′w dw−λj′τdτ j−
∑J
i 6=j
λj/i′τ dτ
i−λj′s dsj−
∑J
i 6=j
λj/i′s ds
i = 0 j = 1, ..., J, (A.1)
where
λju ≡ eju − τ j′ejpu , (A.2)
−λj′w ≡ mj′ + λjk
∑J
l=1
(−ι′rlsp)+ sj′rjsp − τ j′mjp , (A.3)
−λj′τ ≡ λjk
(−ι′rjsp)+ sj′rjsp − τ j′mjp , (A.4)
−λj/i′τ ≡ λjk
(−ι′risp) , (A.5)
−λj′s ≡ λjk
(−ι′rjss)+ sj′rjss + τ j′rjps , (A.6)
−λj/i′s ≡ λjk
(−ι′riss) , (A.7)
λjk = e
j
k − τ j′ejpk , (A.8)
with (A.5) and (A.7) referring to the effects on country j of changes in carbon taxes and
tariffs in all other countries.
Perturbing equations (7) gives∑J
j=1
ejpudu
j = pippdw+
∑J
j=1
pijppdτ
j +
∑J
j=1
pijpsds
j , (A.9)
where
−pipp ≡
∑J
j=1
{
mjp + e
j
pk
∑J
l=1
(−ι′rlsp)} , (A.10)
−pijpp ≡ mjp +
∑J
l=1
elpk
(−ι′rjsp) , (A.11)
−pijps ≡ −rjps +
∑J
l=1
elpk
(−ι′rjss) . (A.12)
Perturbing also (4) and stacking the results along with (A.1) for all countries j and (A.9)
gives the system
Λudu−Λwdw −Λτdτ −Λsds−Λαdα = 0(J+2N−1)×1 , (A.13)
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where the matrices Λu,Λw,Λτ ,Λs are given by
Λu =

λ1u 0 · · · 0
0 λ2u · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · λJu
e1pu e
2
pu · · · eJpu
0N×J

du =

du1
du2
...
duJ

Λw ≡

λ1′w
...
λJ ′w
pipp
0N×(N−1)
dw ≡

dw2
dw3
...
dwN

Λτ ≡

λ1′τ λ
1/2′
τ · · · λ1/J ′τ
λ2/1′τ λ
2′
τ · · · λ2/J ′τ
...
...
. . .
...
λJ/1′τ λ
J/2′
τ · · · λJ ′τ
pi1pp pi
2
pp · · · piJpp
0N×J(N−1)

dτ =

dτ 1
dτ 2
...
dτ J

Λs ≡

λ1′s λ
1/2′
s · · · λ1/J ′s
λ2/1′s λ
2′
s · · · λ2/J ′s
...
...
. . .
...
λJ/1′s λ
J/2′
s · · · λJ ′s
pi1ps pi
2
ps · · · piJps
0N×JN

ds ≡

ds1
ds2
...
dsJ

Λα ≡

−w′ 0′ · · · 0′
0′ −w′ · · · 0′
...
...
. . .
...
0′ 0′ · · · −w′
0¯ 0¯ 0¯ 0¯
IN IN · · · IN

dα ≡

dα1
dα2
...
dαJ
 . (A.14)
Notice that Λu is of dimension (J+2N−1)×J , Λw of dimension (J+2N−1)× (N−1),
Λτ of (J + 2N − 1)×J(N − 1), Λs of dimension (J + 2N − 1)×JN and Λα of dimension
(J + 2N − 1)× JN .
The analysis that follows uses Motzkin’s theorem of the Alternative, which states (Man-
gasarian (1969), p.29) that for a system of the form in (A.13) either there exists du ≥ 0J×1
and dw such that Λudu + Ddx = 0 or there exists y such that
y′Λu  0′1×J , (A.15)
y′D = 0′ . (A.16)
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The focus is thus on solutions to necessary conditions for Pareto-efficiency of the form
y′D∗ = 0′ where D∗ is the submatrix of D corresponding to whichever of the instru-
ments in dx may be deployed. For this is helpful to partition the vector y′ = (σ′,v′, ω′)
conformably with the block structure of the matrices in (A.13). Starting from a tight
equilibrium, it is required that σ  0J×1. 
Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 1
With w, τ and s freely available, the conditions y′Λw = 0′, y′Λτ = 0′ and y′Λs = 0′
imply, respectively, that∑J
j=1
σj
{
mj′ + λjk
∑J
l=1
(−ι′rlsp)+ sj′rjsp − τ j′mjp}+ v′ {∑J
j=1
[
mjp + e
j
pk
∑J
l=1
(−ι′rlsp)]}
(B.1)
= 0′1×(N−1) ,
σj
{
λjk
(−ι′rjsp)+ sj′rjsp − τ j′mjp}+∑J
l 6=j
σlλlk
(−ι′rjsp)+ v′ {mjp +∑J
l=1
elpk
(−ι′rjsp)}
(B.2)
= 0′1×(N−1) , j = 1, . . . J ,
σj
{
λjk
(−ι′rjss)+ sj′rjss + τ j′rjps}+∑J
l 6=j
σlλlk
(−ι′rjss)+ v′ {−rjps +∑J
l=1
elpk
(−ι′rjss)}
(B.3)
= 0′1×N , j = 1, . . . J .
Post-multiplying (B.3) by (rjss)
−1
rjsp and comparing the result with left-hand-side of (B.2),
using also the definitions in (A.4)-(A.7), non-singularity of mjp implies that
σjτ j = v, j = 1, . . . J , (B.4)
from which part (b) of the proposition follows. Part (a) follows on using (B.4) and (A.8)
in (B.3). Finally, (A.15) implies, recalling (A.2), that
σj
(
eju − τ j′ejpu
)
+ v′ejpu > 0 , j = 1, . . . J , (B.5)
and hence, from (B.4), σj > 0, j = 1, . . . J . 
Appendix C: Proof of Proposition 2
It suffices to show that in either of the circumstances envisaged in the proposition
σj = σ , j = 1, . . . J . (C.1)
Starting with the case in which explicit lump-sum transfers are available, the condition
y′Λα = 0′1×J(N−1) implies (C.1). Part (a) then follows directly from part (a) of Proposition
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1, and part (b) from noting that (again from part (b) of Proposition 1) with τ j = τ ,
j = 1, . . . J, the common tariff vector can be normalized to zero.
When explicit transfers are unavailable, using (B.4) and (A.2) in the condition y′Λw =
0′1×(N−1) gives ∑J
j=1
σj
{
mj′ + ejk
∑J
l=1
(−ι′rlsp)+ sj′rjsp} = 0′1×(N−1) , (C.2)
which, using part (a) of the proposition, becomes
M′σ= 0(N−1)×1 , (C.3)
where
M′ =
[
m1 m2 · · · mJ ]
(N−1)×J . (C.4)
Recall, from (7), that market clearing implies M′ιJ×1 = 0(N−1)×1, so that M′ has column
rank of no more that J−1. If it has precisely this rank, then σJ×1 must be collinear with
ιJ×1 implying again that σj = σ, for j = 1, . . . , J . 
Appendix D: Proof of Proposition 5
In this case, with countries other than h constrained, conditions (B.2) and (B.3) can be
assumed to hold only for j = h. Proceeding as in the proof of Proposition 1 gives
σhτ h = v . (D.1)
Using this and (A.2) in (B.3) for j = h, part (a) follows. Using part (a) and (A.2) in
(B.1) gives part (b). 
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